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CONCEPTIONS OF MECHANISMS AND  
INSENSITIVITY OF CAUSATION  
VIOREL PÂSLARU 
University of Dayton 
vpaslaru1@udayton.edu   
ABSTRACT:  Conceptions of mechanisms due to Glennan (1996; 2002), Machamer, Darden, and Craver 
(2000), Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005) have developed in opposition to the nomological approach to 
explanation. It is less emphasized, however, that these conceptions have also developed as alternatives to the 
causal perspective on explanation. In this paper, I argue that despite their distancing from the topic of causation, 
the mechanistic conceptions need to incorporate in their definitions of mechanisms the notion of insensitivity of 
causal relations that was examined by Woodward (2006). 
KEYWORDS:  mechanism; causation; insensitivity. 
 
1. Insensitivity of Causation 
 Woodward (2006) claims that a causal relationship ‘C causes E’ is sensitive if it holds in the 
actual background circumstances Bi, but fails to hold in the circumstances Bii-n that depart in 
various ways from the actual circumstances. A causal relationship is less sensitive, i.e., more 
insensitive or stable, if it holds over a broader range of circumstances that depart in various ways 
from the actual ones. Suppose Suzy throws a rock at a glass bottle and it shatters. The causal 
relationship between Suzy throwing the rock and the bottle shattering is insensitive to various 
changes in the background conditions in the sense that it will continue to hold even if the throwing 
and the shattering occur in Boston while someone sneezes in Chicago, regardless of the color of 
Suzy’s blouse and despite variations in environmental conditions (temperature, wind speed, etc.). 
The bottle would have shattered had Suzy thrown the rock earlier or later, or from a different angle. 
If departures from actuality alter the time and place of the causal relationship, this may affect the 
identity of causal relata such that instead of a C-event and an E-event there will be a C-like and an 
E- like event (Woodward 2006). This would probably translate into a case involving Jenny in 
Chicago, instead of Suzy in Boston, throwing a metallic object, instead of a rock, at the bottle that 
subsequently shatters. 
 Woodward’s proposal can be examined more specifically to suggest three types of 
insensitivity to changes in the structure of a causal relation and two types of background conditions. 
Componential insensitivity of a causal relationship obtains when the relationship is not affected by 
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changes in its relata. Suzy might throw a rock, or a brick, or a metallic object at the bottle and it will 
break, preserving thereby the causal relationship. Organizational insensitivity characterizes the 
causal relationship that is not altered by changes in the arrangement of its relata. Suzy might throw 
the rock from various distances or under various angles, but the relationship will be preserved, since 
the bottle will break. Interactional insensitivity characterizes the case when changes in how the 
relata interact do not impact the causal relationship. Suzy could throw the rock more or less 
forcefully, but this will not affect the relationship as long as the bottle breaks. However, if Suzy 
throws the rock with a too small force and the rock does not reach the bottle, the relationship 
breaks. It is sensitive to a throw executed with a small force.  
 The color of Suzy’s blouse and the Dow index are background conditions that do not and 
cannot affect the causal relationship rock throwing – bottle breaking. Because of that, exploring 
them will not provide important information about the relationship. By contrast, wind is an example 
of background conditions that do not, but can affect the causal relationship. If wind blows with, say, 
a 65 km/h speed, it can blow away the bottle, influence the trajectory of the rock, but the rock will 
nevertheless strike the bottle. This illustrates background conditions that affect a causal relationship, 
yet it still occurs, or is insensitive to influences from such conditions. Due to their potential to 
influence causal relations, background conditions of the latter two types are relevant for 
investigating causal relations.  
 
2. Conceptions of Mechanisms and Insensitivity of Mechanisms 
 In light of the foregoing consideration of insensitivity, I turn now to examining the notions 
of mechanisms and the examples of mechanisms that Machamer et al (2000), Glennan (2002), 
Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005) use to explain their conceptions of mechanisms and mechanistic 
explanation. 
 Machamer et al claim that “[m]echanisms are regular in that they work always or for the 
most part in the same way under the same conditions” (2000, 3). Yet they do not clarify in what 
respects the conditions are the same. Their claim could be interpreted as indicating insensitivity of 
mechanisms under background conditions that (a) do not change, or (b) change without affecting 
the functioning of the mechanism. Version (a) does not seem to do justice to some mechanisms and 
is, hence, problematic. Version (b) might mean that conditions could be the same in the sense that 
conditions Bii of one neuron differ only by a small degree from conditions Bi of another neuron, or 
even if they differ by a greater degree, they do not contain factors that might affect the mechanism 
functioning. Conditions Bi and Bii could be the same in the sense that they both contain the same 
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ions of Ca, Na, and Mg, but in different quantities. Moreover, the claim does not suggest whether 
the conditions affect in any way the functioning of the mechanism. If my reading of “the same” is 
correct, Machamer et al leave out the situation when the conditions are different. For example, Bii 
could contain factors, say, molecules of Methylenedioxymethamphetamine, that Bi does not, and 
these factors influence the production of phenomenon, but do not block it. Such cases show that 
their description of background conditions is incomplete. That “[t]he organization of ... entities and 
activities determines the ways in which they produce the phenomenon” (Machamer et al 2000, 3) 
suggests that the phenomenon production is sensitive to changes in the organization of component 
activities and entities, but they do not consider the case of organizational insensitivity, i.e., when a 
mechanism produces a phenomenon despite changes in its organization. It seems, however, that 
they admit componential insensitivity. Along this line could be read the claim “Activities usually 
require that entities have specific types of properties” (Machamer et al 2000, 3), which leaves open 
the possibility that any type of entity that has the relevant properties can execute the activity. The 
examination by Machamer et al of mechanisms does not seem to engage interactional insensitivity. 
 The mechanisms of chemical transmission at synapses and depolarization illustrate the view 
of Machamer et al on mechanisms. Examination of these mechanisms shows that they exhibit 
multiple kinds of insensitivity and the characterization of mechanisms by Machamer et al should 
explicitly consider them. The following analysis of these mechanisms is based on Levitan and 
Kaczmarek (1997). 
 Calcium channels illustrate insensitivity to the influence of background conditions that affect 
casual relations, as well as componential insensitivity. A subunit, α1, and one, or several, smaller 
subunits β, γ, α2, and δ constitute calcium channels. α1 is sufficient to make a functional voltage-
dependent calcium channel. The smaller subunits are not necessary for channel activity, yet they 
interact with the α1-subunit and modulate the kinetic properties of the channel. β subunit, when 
expressed with α1-subunit, increases the rate of inactivation of the channel. Although the channel 
inactivates at a faster rate, the β subunit does not block its functioning. The functioning of the 
channel is thus insensitive to the presence of this subunit. The latter modulates the channel 
functioning, but does not break it. Another case of insensitivity refers to the interaction between 
neurotransmitters and receptors. Virtually every neurotransmitter interacts with more than a single 
class of receptors (Levitan and Kaczmarek 1997, 236). Acetylcholine interacts with nicotinic as 
well as muscarinic receptors. The insensitivity of the relationship between neurotransmitter and 
receptors is limited; it breaks if the receptor is a different one, e.g., NMDA. Yet it is insensitive 
because receptors do not interact with just one type of neurotransmitters. Sensitivity can be found in 
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the relationship between transporter proteins and a particular neurotransmitter. The mechanisms of 
neurotransmitter uptake involve distinct transporter proteins that are specific because they transport 
a particular neurotransmitter (Levitan and Kaczmarek 1997, 220). The relationship between 
transporter proteins as part of the mechanism of neurotransmitter uptake and neurotransmitters is 
highly sensitive to the identity of the component neurotransmitter that it is supposed to transport. 
Change the neurotransmitter, and the transporter protein does not take the neurotransmitter and the 
uptake mechanism does not function. 
 Modulation of patterns of electric activity of cells due to the presence of certain chemicals in 
the cell environment further illustrates insensitivity to changes in background conditions that affect 
a causal relationship. Action potentials result from the activity of a population of ion channels. 
Calcium channels contribute to the depolarizing phase of the action potential, while potassium 
channels underlie the repolarization phase and contribute to determining the action potential shape. 
The calcium and potassium channels, the ions, the cell membrane are the key components of the 
mechanism responsible for action potential. The environment of the neuron comprises the 
background conditions. A variety of neurotransmitters might be present in it. The neurotransmitters 
might decrease the calcium or sodium currents, narrowing as a result the action potential, as it 
happens for instance in the neurons of the chick dorsal root ganglion. Alternatively, introduction of 
noradrenaline, or of other similar agonists, in the environment of cardiac muscle cells increases the 
activity of calcium channels, which in turn prolongs significantly the cardiac action potential. The 
neurotransmitters and the noradrenaline modulate the action potentials. The latter would have 
occurred even if those substances were not present in the cell environment. Given that 
neurotransmitters and noradrenaline do not break the relationship between ion channels and action 
potentials, but modify it, the relationship is insensitive. The neurotransmitters and the noradrenaline 
make up the background conditions that can change a causal relationship, and the relationship holds 
despite changes in these conditions. 
 The foregoing neurobiological example does not illustrate organizational insensitivity, yet 
Machamer et al need to consider it for their account of mechanism to be general.  
Bechtel and Abrahamsen have recently offered this characterization of mechanisms: 
A mechanism is a structure performing a function in virtue of its component parts, 
component operations, and their organization. The orchestrated functioning of the 
mechanism, manifested in patterns of change over time in properties of its parts and 
operations, is responsible for one or more phenomena (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2010, 
323). 
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 The phrase in boldface is an augmentation of their earlier (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005, 
Bechtel 2006) characterization of mechanisms. The purpose of augmentation is to extend the 
mechanistic explanation to accounts of dynamics of mechanisms by means of computational 
modeling. Neither the older nor the recent characterizations consider the behavior of mechanisms 
when there is change in their background conditions or in their structure. However, Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen’s discussion of homeostatic or autopoietic organization of organisms can be interpreted 
as insensitivity to background conditions that can or do affect the mechanism. Homeostatic or 
autopoietic organization occurs in living systems that “resist those environmental forces that 
threaten them,” as well as in systems that simply maintain themselves even if not threatened by 
environmental forces (Bechtel 2006, 45). These systems are insensitive to influences from 
background conditions that can affect them. Bechtel and Abrahamsen do not examine mechanisms 
that do not have the specific homeostatic or autopoietic organization and yet resist “environmental 
forces that threaten them,” nor do they examine the case of insensitivity to structural changes. The 
heart example that they use to illustrate their conception of mechanisms presents however sufficient 
instances of insensitivity to changes in its structure and in its background conditions. 
 Hearts have features that escape Bechtel and Abrahamsen’s characterization of mechanisms. 
The heart mechanism undergoes changes over time and yet its operations are stable and they 
produce the phenomenon of blood circulation. The fetal heart shows a rate of 120 to 160 beats per 
minute, that of an infant presents a rate of 120 beats per minute. The rate slows to 90 rates per 
minute when the child is seven years old, and stabilizes at 70 rates per minute at age 18. Depending 
on which activities one engages in, the heart rate would increase or decrease. If rate is an aspect of 
organization, we have here an instance when the mechanism is insensitive to changes in its 
organization. The mechanism does not break although the organization changes. Moreover, rate 
changes mean differences in how components interact, suggesting interactional insensitivity. The 
heart mechanism is also insensitive to a number of significant changes in its components. Until the 
heart becomes of an adult, it is of a fetus, infant, toddler, child, and teenager. The components of the 
heart change; they grow. There are also macromolecular changes in the heart tissue from birth to 
adulthood. For example, there are changes in the expressed proteins, which affect muscle 
contractility (Martinsen and Lohr 2005). Thus, the heart is developmentally insensitive to 
modifications in its structure that occur over long and short periods of time. 
 A more radical change in the components of hearts presents replacement of defective valves 
with mechanical ones (from titanium or ceramic), or biological ones (from human, porcine or 
bovine tissue). Similarly, blocked arteries in some hearts are replaced with coronary bypass grafts. 
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The functioning of the heart mechanism is insensitive to such changes in its components and 
organization, and it produces the blood circulation phenomenon. 
 Transplanted hearts show insensitivity to changes in background conditions. Some of these 
conditions in the recipient patient, like the thorax, do not affect the functioning of the heart and it is 
insensitive to changes in thoraxes. Others, for example the immune system of the receiving 
organism, can and do affect it by rejecting the donated organ. The functioning of the heart 
mechanism can be, at least for some time, insensitive to changes in immune systems from donor to 
recipient and to adverse reaction of the latter. 
 Fetal hearts present a different departure from the adult heart prototype. The interatrial 
septum of a fetal heart contains the foramen ovale valve that allows the blood to be shunned from 
the right (pulmonary) side to the left (systemic) side. The ligament of the inferior vena cava aids 
this flow and the duct of the artery connects the left pulmonary artery and the aortic artery. These 
specific features of the components of fetal hearts are required because fetal blood flows through 
umbilical atria and arteries, and oxygenation occurs in placenta, as opposed to in the lungs. At birth, 
the foramen ovale closes and the heart chambers are septated, the duct ceases its function, and blood 
circulates as in adults (Weinhaus and Roberts 2005). In Woodward’s terminology, fetal blood 
circulation is like adult blood circulation. Correspondingly, the structure of the fetal heart is like that 
of an adult. Except for the foramen ovale, the ligament, the duct and the blood flow, the heart 
mechanism is insensitive to changes from fetal phase to adult phase. Bechtel and Abrahamsen 
(2005) somewhat capture this particular aspect of insensitivity when they claim that a mechanism 
presents variations relative to a prototype, their focus being on componential insensitivity, but not 
on the other types of insensitivity. What does not vary between the prototype and the variant is an 
insensitive structure. 
 Glennan’s characterization of mechanisms does not show an explicit acceptance of any 
version of insensitivity: 
A mechanism for a behavior is a complex system that produces that behavior by the 
interaction of a number of parts, where the interaction between parts can be 
characterized by direct, invariant, change-relating generalizations (2002, S344).  
 An important feature of mechanisms is that the arrangement of their parts is stable. Glennan 
explains first stability of parts: “in the absence of interventions, their properties must remain 
relatively stable” (Glennan 2002, S345). Stability in this sense is rather similar to the insensitivity 
of Suzy’s throw and the shattering of the bottle given the color of her blouse. The relationship 
between the throw and the shattering is stable because the blouse does not affect it. By contrast, the 
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properties of parts could remain stable despite interventions, but Glennan does not consider such a 
case. Watches, cells, organisms and social groups are mechanisms “consisting of stable 
arrangements of parts” (Glennan 2002, S345). Given the foregoing clarification of “stable,” 
mechanisms turn out to be stable because nothing intervenes on them. However, the mechanisms 
that Glennan gives as examples suggest a different understanding of stability. A social group is 
subject to social influences, a watch is subject to various mechanical stresses, and the immune 
system of the recipient patient affects the heart, and yet all three maintain their stability, which 
would amount to insensitivity to background changes that affect the mechanism. Since Glennan 
uses the heart and cell examples as illustrations of his conceptions, the findings concerning these 
mechanisms that I outlined above hold here as well. For the sake of brevity, I will not repeat them 
here, but I will remind that they show that causal relations and mechanisms are insensitive to 
changes in their components, interactions between them and their organization. 
 Glennan also states that the behaviors of these mechanisms “can manifest themselves at 
more than one time and place”(2002, S345). This would be a case of insensitivity to changes in the 
background conditions time and space. However, if the two conditions are not accompanied by 
other conditions that can affect the functioning of the mechanism, then the capacity of a mechanism 
to manifest its behavior at various times and places is a rather weak form of insensitivity. 
 
Conclusion 
 The foregoing examination has shown that insensitivity is implicit to various degrees in the 
conceptions of Machamer et al, Glennan, Bechtel and Abrahamsen. Their examples of mechanisms 
are insensitive in many important ways and to different degrees. To account for these cases, their 
conceptions of mechanisms need to incorporate the notion of insensitivity to structural changes and 





Bechtel, W., and Abrahamsen, A. 2010, ‘Dynamic mechanistic explanation: Computational 
modeling of circadian rhythms as an exemplar for cognitive science’, Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science Part A 41, 321-333. 
Bechtel, W., and Abrahamsen, A. 2005, ‘Explanation: a mechanist alternative’, Studies in History 
and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36, 421-441. 
Glennan, S. 1996, ‘Mechanisms and the nature of causation’, Erkenntnis 44, 49-71. 
Glennan, S. 2002, ‘Rethinking mechanistic explanation’, Philosophy of Science 69, S342-S353. 
Proceedings of the VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science 
Actas del VII Congreso de la Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España
487
Levitan, I.B., and Kaczmarek L.K. 1997, The neuron: cell and molecular biology, New York, 
Oxford University Press. 
Machamer, P, Darden L., and Craver C. F. 2000, ‘Thinking about mechanisms’, Philosophy of 
Science 67, 1-25. 
Martinsen, B., and Lohr J. L. 2005, ‘Cardiac development’, in Iaizzo P.A. (ed.), Handbook of 
cardiac anatomy, physiology, and devices, Totowa, Humana Press Inc., 15-23. 
Weinhaus, A. J., and Roberts K.P. 2005, ‘Anatomy of Human Heart’, in Iaizzo P.A. (ed.), Handbook 
of cardiac anatomy, physiology, and devices, Totowa, Humana Press Inc., 51-79.  
Woodward, J. 2006, ‘Sensitive and Insensitive Causation’, Philosophical Review 115, 1-50.  
  
Proceedings of the VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science 
Actas del VII Congreso de la Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España
488
